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Abstract: Corporate governance literature argues that board diversity is potentially positively 
related to firm performance. This study examines the relationship in the case of women in top 
executive jobs and on boards of directors. We use data for the 2500 largest Danish firms 
observed during the period 1993–2001 and find that the proportion of women in top 
management jobs tends to have positive effects on firm performance, even after controlling 
for numerous characteristics of the firm and direction of causality. The results show that the 
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CERIS-CNR, Torino, and the other participants at the workshop for helpful comments.   1. Introduction 
During the latest decade, there has been an increasing focus on the gender of top 
executives and boards of directors of firms. The proportion of women reaching top positions 
is still very low in most countries, though it has been increasing in for instance the US and in 
some European countries. Some governments, like in Sweden and Norway, have even 
introduced regulations of the gender composition of the boards of directors of private firms in 
order to improve equal opportunities. In Norway, the government has decided that for large 
Norwegian firms at least 40% of the members of the boards of directors must be women in 
2005. This seems to have had a major impact on the recruitment practices for Norwegian 
board members, see Hoel (2005). According to Hoel, the proportion of women in Norwegian 
listed firms increased from about 6% in 2000 to 22% in 2005.  
Parallel to this discussion, focus has been on good corporate governance in many 
countries (see for instance for the US TIAA-CREF (2004) and for Denmark Nørby Johansen 
et al. (2001)). One of the aspects of good corporate governance is diversity management. If it 
is actually the case that more women (or minority groups) as top executives or members of 
boards of directors have a positive effect on shareholder value and firm performance, this 
may be a strong argument for having more women in top management.  
In this study, we analyse whether female top executives and women on boards of 
directors have any significant effect on firm performance measured by alternative 
performance measures. The study examines the relationship between management diversity 
and firm performance for the 2500 largest Danish firms observed during the period 1992–
2001. Management diversity is defined as the proportion of women among the highest 
ranking CEOs in firms and on boards of directors. We estimate various panel data models of 
  2firm performance and control for factors that are traditionally found to affect firm 
performance e.g. firms’ age, size, sector, export orientation. We find that after controlling for 
these observed factors, the proportion of women among top executives and on boards of 
directors tends to have a significantly positive effect on firm performance. A large part of this 
effect is attributed to the female managers with the best qualifications in terms of education, 
and for the female board members it appears that the ones representing the staff have the 
largest positive impact on firm performance. However, when controlling for unobserved 
firm-specific factors, the effect often turns insignificant. This may reflect that until now very 
few Danish firms have had women at the CEO level, and thus panel estimates of the 
performance effects of female CEOs are determined with a large statistical uncertainty. An 
alternative explanation may be, that the relatively few firms who hire women at the top level 
of their organization are firms which are also doing well on a number of other unmeasured 
characteristics (for instance good working conditions and work environment, a more 
focussed recruitment policy etc.).  Another crucial issue is the direction of causality (i.e. do 
women on boards really affect firm performance or is it actually the case that better 
performing firms are more likely to hire women?). Therefore, tests for causality between the 
gender proportion on boards of directors and firm performance are performed. We find that 
the positive relationship is due to board diversity affecting firm performance, not the 
opposite.  
 
2. Theoretical considerations and earlier findings  
There are a number of arguments in favour of diversity of board members to be found 
in the previous literature, see for instance Bantel and Jackson (1989) and Murray (1989). 
  3Carter et al. (2003) list 5 positive arguments from a ‘business case perspective’ and also 
discuss diversity management in a principal agent framework. Among the arguments pro 
diversity management is that a more diverse board of directors (or executive board) is able to 
make decisions based on the evaluation of more alternatives compared to a more 
homogenous board. A heterogenous board compared to a homogenous board is able to have a 
better understanding of the market place of the firm, and furthermore diversity increases 
creativity and innovation. Diversity management may also improve the image of the firm and 
in this way have positive effects on firm performance and shareholder value if the positive 
image has positive effects on customers’ behaviour. Beside the arguments listed in Carter et 
al. (2003), another argument for aiming at a more diverse composition of board members is 
that if only male individuals are potential candidates for the boards, the selection of board 
members will take place from only this selected distribution of qualifications, and on average 
this implies a much lower quality than if the candidates are selected among the best from the 
distribution of both men and women (or include minority groups). 
However, there may also be arguments against diversity management. If a 
heterogenous board produces more opinions and more critical questions, this may be time-
consuming and may not be as effective as a more homogenous board of directors, especially 
if the firm is operating in a highly competitive environment where the ability to react quickly 
to market shocks is an important issue. A culturally, ethnically or gender diverse board may 
experience more conflicts, and even though the decisions may have a better quality in the 
end, this may not balance the negative effects of a more slow decision-making process if the 
market place of the firm demands quick responses, see Hambrick et al. (1996). Thus, based 
on theory, the answer concerning the financial effects of diversity management and women 
  4on boards is undetermined a priori. Predictions from the previous empirical evidence are 
ambiguous. Most of the empirical studies have been based on US data,
1 and most of the 
studies include only the largest firms. Shrader et al. (1997) analyse the 200 largest US firms 
and they are unable to find any significantly positive relationship between the percentage of 
female board members and firm performance (measured by ROA and ROE). They even find 
significantly negative relations in some cases. Kochan et al. (2003) also find no positive 
relations between gender diversity in management and firm performance for US companies. 
Contrary to these findings, Catalyst (2004) and Adler (2001) find positive correlations 
between ‘female-friendly’ US Fortune 500 firms and the performance of these firms. Carter 
et al. (2003) also find a significantly positive effect of the percentage of women and 
minorities on boards of directors and firm value after controlling for a number of other 
factors which may affect firm value. The study by Carter et al. (2003) also controls for the 
direction of causality by estimating an IV-model, see below. A recent study by Bell (2005) 
based on a large sample of US firms find that women in top management (female top CEO or 
board members) have a positive effect on the payment of the executives of the firms, and 
further, these firms also tend to have a higher proportion of women at lower management 
levels.   
Only very few studies from outside the US exist on this topic. Du Rietz and 
Henrekson (2000) analyse firm performance and women on boards for a sample of Swedish 
firms. They find that if not controlling for firm size and sectors, firms with women on the 
board seem to under-perform. However, when controlling for these factors, the under-
performance hypothesis could not be confirmed. For Denmark, a recent study by Rose (2004) 
                                                 
1 Carter et al. (2003) give a survey of the empirical results for the US.  
  5did not find any significant relationship between the percentage of women on the boards of 
directors of the largest listed Danish firms and firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q).  
Thus, the conclusion from the previous empirical studies is ambiguous. Besides the 
ambiguous theoretical predictions, the diverse empirical evidence may be due to different 
estimation methods. In some studies, no controls for other factors are included. For instance 
size and age of the firm (which are factors known to affect firm performance) may correlate 
with the percentage of females on boards, and thus it may blur the picture if not controlled 
for. Further, there may be a number of other unobserved factors which are important for firm 
performance, but which will perhaps never be observable for the researcher. Therefore, panel 
data where the same firms are observed in a number of years may give a more reliable 
picture than cross-section studies based on only one year of observation.  
A further problem with many of the existing studies is that the samples used are 
typically only based on the largest (listed) firms for which it is possible to get reliable 
information. Therefore, the results may not be representative for all firms in a given country. 
Finally, the direction of causation is important to control for. If well-performing firms decide 
to employ more women (or minorities) because they decide on a more risky strategy with 
respect to recruiting board members, the observed relationship between diversity 
management and firm performance will tend to become positive. If this is the case, causality 
may run from performance to diversity management and not the reverse. 
 
3. Data 
In this study, we aim at overcoming a number of the weaknesses in some of the 
earlier studies by using a rather unique data set based on the 2500 largest Danish firms 
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extensive information on the firms and the characteristics of the board members and thus 
allows us to use panel estimators and control for causality. The data set contains register 
information from Statistics Denmark who collects information for all Danish firms on a 
number of firm characteristics for administrative purposes. The information on firms is 
merged with individual information on the employees of the firm, including information on 
background characteristics of the CEOs and their spouses. However, since Statistics 
Denmark does not collect information on for instance board memberships, the information 
from administrative registers has been merged with information from a private Danish data 
register KOB (Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau). KOB collects information on 
economic performance, board members of the firms etc. based on annual company reports to 
the authorities. These reports are publicly available. KOB collects and harmonises this 
information.   
            The sample is selected from the administrative registers as the 3000 largest Danish 
firms, defined by gross turnover of the firms during each of the years 1993–2001. We 
exclude companies with extreme values, defined as either a negative value of net capital or 
an extreme relationship between firm’s revenue and employment in order to get rid of 
holding companies etc. This means that the effective sample is reduced to about 2300-2500 
firms for each of the years. For some of the variables, for instance membership of board of 
directors, information is only available for the latest part of the period (1996–2001). The 
sample is unbalanced, i.e. firms which are close to the cut-off criterion of being among the 
3000 largest Danish firms may drop out of the sample in some years.
2 The sample consists of 
                                                 
2 A potential problem using unbalanced panel data is that firms are entering and leaving the data set and that 
these changes are likely not to be random. Firm exits depend on performance, which potentially may depend on 
  7listed as well as non-listed firms. In Denmark, there are approximately 300 listed firms. The 
selection criterium implies that most of these firms are selected into the sample. However, 
most of the firms included in the data are not listed firms. Consequently, this data set is much 
broader and more representative compared to the samples used in many other studies of 
women in management.   
  Four alternative measures on firm performance are available in the data. We use all 
four alternative measures in the analyses in order to test the robustness of our results: 
1.  Gross value added/net turnover   
2.  Profit on ordinary operations/net turnover  
3.  Ordinary result/net assets  
4.  Net result after tax/net assets  
 
Gross value added and profit on ordinary operations are both approximations of the 
firms’ markup. Gross value added is measured by net turnover minus input expenses (raw 
materials etc.). Profit on ordinary operations is defined as gross values added minus variable 
costs of capacity (wages, costs of running machines etc.). Consequently, both measures relate 
to the firms’ basic activities. The ordinary result is defined as the net result of the firm taking 
into account deductions and financial payments, but not inclusive extraordinary revenues and 
expenses.  
In Denmark, the management of private firms is organized as a two tier system. The 
board of directors which is chosen by the stockholders typically consists of external board 
members (except for staff members representing the employees of the firm, see below). The 
chairman of the board (president) is also usually an external member, i.e. the CEOs are 
                                                                                                                                                       
the gender composition of the board. In order to analyse this potential problem, we have calculated the sample 
proportion of women in top management for exit and entry firms and tested whether this proportion was higher 
for exit and entry firms than for firms who stayed in the sample during all years. We did not find any significant 
differences in the female proportion for entry and exit firms compared to firms who stayed in the sample. 
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organization of the management is often different. Here, the top CEO (often member of the 
owners’ families) may also be chairman of the board of directors. Further, it is very common 
that the board of directors consists of mainly members of the owners’ families.  
In order to measure gender diversity in management, we apply a number of alternative 
measures of gender diversity in management. The most restrictive definition includes only 
the proportion of women among the top CEOs in the firm.
3 However, as a large proportion of 
Danish firms have only one top CEO, we also introduce a broader definition of management 
including vice-directors.  
Further, we have information on the proportion of women on the boards of directors. 
According to Danish law, a number of board members are selected among the staff in firms 
with more than 35 employees. The number of staff representatives depends on the size of the 
board. Traditionally, the proportion of women among the board members who represent the 
staff is larger than among other board members. In some of the estimations, we distinguish 
between the two types of board members.  
In order to control for other factors, which may affect firm performance, a number of 
other variables are included in the analysis. Firm size is measured by the number of 
employees, i.e. performance is expected to be positively related to firm size, because larger 
firms normally have more market power, Bain (1951), Smirlock et al. (1984). Younger firms 
are expected to have smaller earnings than older ones, because they have less experience in 
the market, are in a phase of building up their market position, and they normally have 
                                                 
3 The measure which includes only top CEOs is defined as Disco 1, 12, 121 according to the occupational codes 
applied by Statistics Denmark, while the category ‘top CEOs plus vice-directors’ also includes Disco 122 and 
123.  
  9relatively higher capital costs as compared to older firms.
4 However, older firms may become 
more lax or be at a point on their product life cycle with declining earnings. Thus, it may be 
argued that the effect of firm age is an inverse U-shape. We also control for the export 
orientation of the firm. Firms that are heavily engaged at export markets (high 
export/turnover rate) operate in potentially larger markets, and this is expected to affect their 
profits positively. In line with other studies, we control for potential effects on profit due to 
entry barriers for the concerned industry by using a measure of the minimum efficient scale 
(MES) to the market (industry) size, where MES is approximated by the first quartile firm’s 
turnover within the particular industry (measured at the 4-digit level).
5
Table 1 shows mean statistics for the variables included in the data set. Note that due 
to missing information, the number of observations varies for each variable. The reported 
number of observations is the maximum number for the sample. The data is divided into two 










                                                 
4 See e.g. Lipczinsky & Wilson (2001) p. 144. 
5 MES is calculated by using the total sample of Danish firms which is approximately 25000 firms. 
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 2001  1993 
 Firms  with 













Female Proportion:         
         CEOs   0.499       
(0.300) 
  0.567       
(0.293) 
 
         CEOs and vice-directors  0.292       
(0.204) 
0.063       
(0.154) 
0.357       
(0.269) 
0.036        
(0.114) 
         Board of directors, excl. staff   0.139       
(0.184) 
0.067       
(0.138) 
  
         Board of directors, staff only   0.133       
(0.251) 
0.061        
(0.180) 
  
Firm Performance:      
         Gross value added/net turnover  0.353       
(0.189) 
0.305       
(0.213) 
0.398       
(0.200) 
0.325        
(0.208) 
         Profit ordinary operations/net turnover  0.036       
(0.101) 
0.045       
(0.106) 
0.042       
(0.058) 
0.045        
(0.078) 
         Ordinary result/net assets  0.210       
(0.433) 
0.234        
(0.601) 
  0.707       
(1.150) 
         Net result after tax/net assets  0.151       
(0.345) 
0.160      
(0.357) 
0.178       
(0.459) 
0.176       
(0.355) 
Sector:      
         Primary    0.0151      
(0.122) 
  0.015       
(0.122) 
         Manufacturing  0.343       
(0.477) 
0.300       
(0.459) 
0.348       
(0.481) 
0.321       
(0.467) 
         Energy and water    0.021        
(0.142) 
  0.006       
(0.078) 
         Building and construction   0.051       
(0.220) 
0.045       
(0.208) 
  0.055      
(0.227) 
         Retail, hotel and restaurants  0.374       
(0.486) 
0.402        
(0.490) 
0.391       
(0.493) 
0.384        
(0.486) 
         Transportation, telecommunication etc.  0.040       
(0.198) 
0.050       
(0.219) 
0.043       
(0.206) 
0.044       
(0.205) 
         Private service  0.192       
(0.396) 
0.166       
(0.373) 
0.217       
(0.417) 
0.175      
(0.380) 
Age of firm (year)  40.040      
(37.482) 
32.693      
(32.981) 
43.690     
(25.886) 
38.415      
(32.802) 
Number of employees  626.061       
(1644.250) 
201.498     
(609.022) 
352.175     
(684.714) 
154.332     
(427.710) 
Export:      
         Low (less than 10% of turnover)   0.242       
(0.431) 
0.324       
(0.468) 
0.413       
(0.498) 
0.555      
(0.497) 
         High (more than 50% of turnover)  0.737       
(0.442) 
0.659       
(0.474) 
0.261       
(0.444) 
0.203       
(0.402) 
Min. efficient scale relative to market size 
(MES = quartile turnover in industry, 4-digit) 
8.433       
(1.334) 
8.566       
(1.351) 
7.873       
(0.914) 
7.925       
(0.962) 
Number of firms  99  2,380  46  2,108 
The number of observations included in the last row is the maximum number of firms in the year concerned. 
For some of the variables there may be fewer observations than this number. 
  11From the table it is seen that firms having at least one female top CEO also have a 
higher fraction of women in the lower ranks and also in the boards of directors. Thus, there 
seems to be firms that are more “female-friendly” than others.  Considering the means of the 
four performance measures, there is a tendency of firms with female top CEOs doing worse 
than firms with no female top CEOs in 2001. There is substantial variation in the proportion 
of female managers across industries. Some industries (primary sector, energy and water) 
have no firms with a woman among their top CEOs or vice-directors, while other industries 
are more ‘female-friendly’ like private service and retail, hotel and restaurants. This clearly 
indicates substantial industry differences and that this is likely to affect the estimation results. 
From Table 1 it appears that mainly older firms and firms with more employees tend 
to have female managers. However, strong conclusions should not be drawn from these 
simple descriptive statistics, since other characteristics are not controlled for.  
Figure 1 shows the development during the period 1993–2001 in the proportion of 
women among top CEOs and on boards of directors for all the firms included in this study. In 
2001, 4.3% of the top CEOs in the largest Danish firms were women. When extending the 
top management category to include vice-directors, this figure increases to 10.9%. The 
proportion of women on boards of directors was 9.7% when including staff representatives 



















Board of dir., incl. staff
Board of dir., excl. staff
 
The female proportion among CEOs has been slightly increasing during the 1990s 
from 2.5% in 1993 to 4.3% in 2001. When including vice-directors, the proportion of women 
in management has almost doubled, from about 6% in 1993 to 11% in 2001. However, the 
female proportion on boards of directors has declined. It decreased from about 12% in 1996 
to less than 10% in 2001. The decline is mainly due to a relative reduction of female 
members of boards of directors who are not representing the staff. One explanation may be 
that due to the ethics of good corporate performance, still fewer family members are 
members of boards of directors, and this may have reduced the proportion of women. Our 
data does not allow us to test this hypothesis. 
It is difficult to compare with other countries because of different definitions of top 
management and variations in the samples selected. But the figures above seem to be 
relatively low, see Table 2. The Danish figures based on the sample used in this study include 
many relatively small firms. According to Table 1, the average firm size in the Danish 
sample was 219 employees (2001). If only the 113 largest firms in the sample are considered, 
the proportion of females among top CEOs was slightly higher (5.9%) in 2005, see Table 2.  
  13Table 2.  Proportion of women in top management (CEO) and on boards of directors, 






Board of directors  




UK, FTSE 100 firms, 2002  1.0%  8.6% 
France, 2000  2.9%  7.4% 
Sweden, 2002, large firms (sales > SEK 50 million) 





Norway, 2001, firms > 250 employees (CEO) and 
listed firms (board of directors ) 







Denmark, 2001,  2500 largest firms (sales), this study 
 




9.7% (incl. staff) 
7.9% (excl. staff) 
11.7% 
1) A broader definition of top CEO is used than the one used for Denmark. 
2) Weighted average calculated on the basis of 380 and 109 firms who had, respectively had not, answered a 
survey on board membership. Information based on Hoel (2004, p. 13). 
Source: US, Catalyst (2003, 2004), UK, Vinnicombe and Singh (2003), France, Cotta (2000), Sweden, 
Henrekson (2004) and Hoel (2005), Norway, Likestillingssenteret (2001) and Hoel (2004, 2005), Denmark, 
Hoel (2005). 
 
However, this is still much lower than in the US Fortune 500 firms where 10.2% of 
the top CEOs were women in 2000. In Norway, the proportion of women in boards of 
directors has risen dramatically the latest years, clearly as a reaction to government 






  144.  Estimation  
4.1 Basic estimations 
In general, the statistical model of firm performance can be written as, 
(1)     12 3 __ it it it it it P X W CEO W board β ββ ε = ++ +  
where i refers to the firm, and t is time.   is a performance measure. As described in the 
data section, four performance measures are applied: Gross value added/net turnover, profit 
on ordinary operations/net turnover, ordinary result/net assets and net result after tax/net 
assets.  and   are the key variables of this study, i.e. the proportion of 
women in management, measured as (1) Top CEOs, (2) Top CEOs plus vice-directors, (3) 
Members of boards of directors . Hence
it P
_ it WC E O _ it W board
2 β and  3 β are the parameters of primary interest.  it X  
is a vector of other explanatory variables typically assumed to affect firm performance, i.e. 
firm size (number of employees), firm age (years since establishment, potential market size 
(measured by the export-intensity of the firm))
6 and an indicator of entry barriers (minimum 
efficient scale). In addition, we add controls for industry and year of estimation in order to 
deal with changing business conditions. εit is an error component, assumed  to be Nid(0,σε
2). 
Since we have a panel of firms, we are able to control for time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity which may bias the results from cross-section studies if these unobserved 
factors correlate with the proportion of female CEOs. Thus, we also present random and 
fixed effects models of Pit. The panel version of equation (1) is: 
(2)     12 3 __ ( it it it it i it P X W CEO W board ) β ββ α ε = ++ + +
                                                
 
 
6 The estimation forms allow for non-linearity by including squared expressions for firm size and age, see the 
theoretical discussion above.  
  15where  αi is the unobserved heterogeneity term, assumed to be firm-specific and time-
invariant. The random effects estimator is only valid if αi is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. We test the validity of the random effects estimator by a Hausman test. As shown 
below, the Hausman test tends to reject the random effects estimator and thus the fixed 
effects results are preferred. 
The fixed effects estimator is consistent, but it does not give any estimates on 
variables which are time constant. Further, for variables with a small variation, the estimates 
are imprecise (has a large variation) and therefore results tend to become insignificant due to 
small variation across time. The key variable in this study, the proportion of women in 
management, suffers from this problem. Therefore, we first present estimation results from 
pooled estimations of (1), see Table 3, where selected key results of pooled OLS regressions 
based on the sample of firms observed during the period 1993 (or 1996 for board of directors 
estimations) to 2002 are presented.
7 For each of the four performance measures, we have 
estimated four alternative models, including a number of explanatory control variables as 
described above (firm size, firm age etc.) plus the proportions of women in top management 
and the share of women on boards of directors.
8 In the first row of Table 3, the effect of a 
female top CEO is shown, the second row of results shows the coefficients of the female 
proportion among top CEOs and vice-directors, the third row shows the coefficients 
including the variable proportion of women on boards of directors.  
 
                                                 
7 Due to space considerations we do not show the full estimation results for all the models in this paper. The full 
estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 For different reasons, we do not include both W_CEO and W_board in the same regressions but estimate their 
effects in separate regressions. Firstly, W_board is only observed for a sub-period, i.e. the years 1996-2001. 
Second, we are not able to instrument both variables when controlling for reverse causality, and thirdly, the two 
variables are correlated, i.e. we have problems of multicollinarity. Thus, the ‘total effect’ of women in top 
management is not the sum of the two estimated effects.  
  16Table 3. Estimated coefficients of alternative variables reflecting proportion of women in 
management (β2 and β3). Pooled OLS, 1993-2001
1).  
  



















































































* denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 1% level of significance.  
1) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj R
2  is reported in row 3, and row 4 
includes the number of observations in each regression analysis.   
 
The first group of results concerns the effect of female top CEOs. In general, the 
estimated coefficients are positive, but except for column 1 (gross value added/turnover) no 
significant effects are found. However, extending the definition of top management to 
include vice-directors, the estimated coefficients turn significant for three out of four firm 
performance measures. Thus, when controlling for firm size, sector, age of firm etc., we find 
that there is a positive performance effect of female CEOs for Danish firms.  
Turning to the female representation on boards of directors, the results are more 
mixed. When including a variable measuring the proportion of women among all board 
members, there is only one positive and significant coefficient found (profit on primary 
  17operations/turnover) while the coefficient for some performance measures is negative, 
though insignificant. 
In order to control for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity, which may affect firm 
performance, we have also estimated alternative panel data models, where we exploit the fact 
that the same firms are observed several times. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the results 
from fixed effects and random effects estimation the model. The reported Hausman tests 
reject the random effects model in all cases; i.e. the random effects parameters are likely to 
be biased from correlation between the firm-specific effects and the explanatory variables. 
Therefore, the preferred panel data specification is the fixed effect model. As expected, the 
level of significance drops considerably when moving from the pooled OLS to the fixed 
effect estimation. This may be the result of a very small variation in the explanatory 
variables, including the key variables on female proportions in top management or 
measurement errors which reinforce the problems of getting significant coefficients. 
We have experimented with including additional explanatory variables in order to test 
for these effects. For instance, we have information on the R&D intensity of the particular 
industry which the firm belongs to. It may be an indicator for willingness to take risks and 
the level of risk of the environment in which the firm operates. The motivation for 
introducing such variables is that women are often seen as risk adverse, and therefore a 
higher proportion of female managers may affect the degree of risk taken by the firm and 
consequently its performance. On the other hand, R&D may determine diversity, i.e. female 
managers may be less likely to be found as top CEOs in high-risk industries. In order to 
control for risk industries, the firms included in our data were classified according to the 
R&D intensity and the well-known Pavitt-taxonomy was introduced instead of using 
  18traditional industry dummy variables. However, including R&D or Pavitt-dummies in the 
performance equation has no notable influence on the estimation results shown above.  
 
4.2 Direction of causality. 
The direction of causality between firm performance and the proportion of women in  
management has been widely discussed. Thus, according to this discussion some firms may 
be observed to have a high proportion of female CEOs because these firms are currently 
doing well and may be able ‘to take the risk’ of employing a female CEO. If this is the case, 
the direction of causality is the reverse in relation (1)–(2), i.e. profitable firms have relatively 
more female managers than less profitable firms. In order to deal with problems of potential 
endogeneity in Equation (1)–(2), we estimate the models by the use of an instrument variable 
approach. The proportion of women in management in the firm is then estimated by the 
following equation: 
(3)      12 _ it it it it WC E O X Z α αν = ++  
where  Xit is a vector of firm characteristics inclusive firm performance,  it Z are the 
instruments, i.e. factors affecting the proportion of women in management, which at the same 
time do not affect firm performance, and νit is an error component, assumed to be Nid(0,σν
2). 
Since   is a proportion, 0≤ ≤1, a linear specification of (2) is inappropriate. 
Therefore, (3) is estimated by a tobit estimator which takes into account the upper and lower 
_ it WC E O _ it WC E O
limits of the dependent variable,  .   _ it WC E O
   
It is a well-known problem to find valid instruments, i.e. Z-variables. In this study, 
we have individual information on all CEOs employed in the selected firms and the spouses 
of these CEOs. We use the average length of education of the spouses of the other CEOs in 
  19the firm as an instrument. Our hypothesis is that CEOs who are married to well-educated 
spouses (in most cases these are wives) are supposed to be more positive and have a less 
traditional view on the competences of female CEOs, implying that they are more willing to 
hire and accept a woman in their own firm as compared to other CEOs who are married to 
lower educated spouses. Furthermore, the education of the spouse is assumed not to affect the 
firm performance, which seems plausible. However, we are only able to apply an IV-
estimator in the models analysing the effects of female CEOs. We do not have individual 
information on board members since the information on board members does not stem from 
Statistic Denmark’s administrative registers. Thus, we do not have valid instruments for the 
regressions where   enters.  _ it Wb o a r d
In Table 4, the estimates for panel versions of the IV-models are presented. As the 
previous results show that the fixed effect model is strictly preferred to the random effects 
model, only models in which the second step is estimated as pooled OLS and fixed effects 
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Table 4. Estimated coefficients of alternative variables reflecting proportion of women in 
management (β2). IV-estimations, 2
nd step:  pooled OLS and fixed effect estimations, 1993-
2001. Instrument: mean educational level of managers’ wives
1). 
   
Dependent variable: Firm performance 
 
Gross value added/ 
turnover 
 






















































-0.043    
(0.023) 
 
0.014     
 











































0.014     
 
No. of obs.  17,105  17,105  17,105  17,105  17,105  17,105  17,105  17,105 
* denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 1% level of significance.  
1) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj R
2  is reported in row 3, and row 4 
includes the number of observations in each regression analysis. 
 
The results in Table 4 confirm the results presented previously. The estimates from 
IV-pooled OLS show positive, significant relationships between female CEOs and 
comparing to the results of Table 3 (pooled OLS, no IV) the introduction of IV to the pooled 
OLS generates larger and more significant positive effects of women in management. 
However, the results from IV-fixed effects models are again insignificant.
9 Thus, our results 
document, that when controlling for causality, there is still a positive effect of female top 
CEOs and vice-directors. As in Table 3, the size of the effect is larger for the broader group 
                                                 
9The first step results of these models (not presented here) show that the instrument, the average length of 
education of male CEOs, is strongly related to the proportion of female managers in a firm. Formal testing 
procedures also show that the instrument is valid (i.e. the average length of education of male CEOs does not 
affect firm performance).   
  
  21including vice-directors comparing to the effect observed for only top CEOs. One 
explanation of this evidence may be that the relatively large increase in Denmark during the 
period 1993-2001 in female proportion of vice-directors reflects that still more highly 
educated women are now potential candidates for being promoted into top-management due 
to their qualifications and professional skills. Older female top CEOs may to a larger extent 
have been selected due to family ties to the owners’ families. We will pursue this hypothesis 
below. 
Though we are able to reject a hypothesis of reverse causality in our study, it is 
important to stress that the interpretation of our results is not as straightforward as it might 
seem in first instance. Since we find significantly positive coefficients in the pooled OLS 
estimations, but insignificant panel estimates (fixed or random effects), this may reflect that 
the firms who have succeeded in hiring female top managers (or who have a large proportion 
of women as staff members on the board of directors) are the firms with the most 
ambitious/progressive/active characteristics in general. If there exist unobserved 
characteristics of this type in the firm, which are (almost) time constant during our 
observation period, this may at the same time explain that more women are hired in top 
management. For instance firms with an explicit diversity management policy or, in general, 
a more ambitious recruitment policy may also in other respects have characteristics not 
observed (good working environment, high degree of team spirit etc.) which explain firm 
performance and profits.    
  224.3. Qualification effects 
In the previous analysis, we have not looked at the qualifications of female managers, 
i.e. the estimated effects are average effects for all women in top management. However, the 
estimated effects potentially conceal variations in effects of qualifications of the female 
managers. The hypothesis is that the positive effect of women in top management is larger, 
the more qualified the female managers are. If many of the women who are observed as top 
managers in our sample were mainly selected back in time because they were widows or 
daughters of the owner(s) and not because of their formal qualifications relevant for a 
position as a top manager, the estimated coefficients above may not give an adequate picture 
of the potential for a future policy of diversity management and hiring (formally qualified) 
women as top managers.    
In Table 5, the educational distribution of the CEOs is presented. In 1993, 74% of all 
female top CEOs in the sample did not have a theoretical education, while this was only the 
case for 59% of the male top CEOs. These figures change considerably during the 1990s, and 
in 2001 only 46% of female and 44% of male top CEOs had no theoretical education. The 
proportion of female top CEOs holding a university degree almost doubled, from 17% in 
1993 to 32% in 2001, while the same figures for male top CEOs were 30% and 36%, 
respectively. Thus, the educational level of female top CEOs has increased much faster than 
that of male CEOs, and the educational gap has narrowed considerably during the period. 
When including vice-directors, the picture changes. Female CEOs at the level just below the 
top CEO are on average as well educated as their male peers. Since the broader category of 
CEOs including vice-directors is younger than the group of top CEOs on average, this 
  23indicates a development over the period 1993-2001 where Danish female CEOs have become 
still more qualified and have almost closed the qualification gap to their male colleagues. 
 
Table 5.  Educational level among female and male CEOs. 1993 and 2001. 
  1993  2001  1993  2001 
  Top CEOs  Top CEOs and Vice-directors 











0.087 0.113  0.226  0.206  0.094 0.049    0.159  0.136 
No higher 
education/no 
info. on educ 
. 
0.739 0.589  0.459  0.436  0.667 0.723  0.552  0.556 
All  1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 
No. of obs.  46  1020  99  1142  345  1322  641  1408 
  
In order to test whether the differences in formal competences matter for the 
estimated performance effects of women in top management, we split the variable W_CEO 
into three variables which measure the proportion of females among the group of CEOs at 
different educational levels 
(4)       _ _ _ & _ it it it it WC E O Wl o n g WM S WE D U = ++  
where W_longit is the proportion of women among the group of CEOs having at least an 
education at the master level, W_M&Sit is the proportion of  women among the group of 
CEOs having an education at the BA-level or slightly shorter ,  W_EDUit is the proportion of 
women among the group of CEOs having no education or another education, i.e. non 
academic education. Consequently, we estimate the form:  
  24(1a)  12 3 4 __ & _ it it it it it it P X W long W M S W Other β ββ β =+ + + + ε  
Since there are few females in the group of top CEOs, we only estimate (4) for the 
group of CEOs including vice-directors. The results of these estimations (see Table 6) are 
striking, in the sense that they show that a large part of the performance gain from female 
managers can be attributed to the highest educated women for whom the estimated 
performance effects tend to be much larger than for women with a short or medium theoretic 
education (except for Column 2, Profit on primary operations). For women with no 
theoretical education, i.e. women who are either unskilled or have a vocational education, the 
performance effect is larger than for women with a short or medium theoretical education.
10
 
Table 6. Estimated coefficients on effects of proportion of women in management, top CEOs 
and vice-directors (β2). Pooled OLS, 1993-2001
1). 
  
































Medium or short 
higher education 
 

















info. on educ. 
 

























* denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 1% level of significance.  
1) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj R
2  is reported in row 3, and row 4 
includes the number of observations in each regression analysis. 
 
                                                 
10 This result may be explained by the fact that short and medium long theoretical educations in Denmark to a 
large extent are educations related to service and education jobs in the public sector (nurses, teachers, care 
workers etc.).   
  25Among the board members, similar mechanisms may play a role. However, in our 
data only limited information about the board members is available. We do have information 
on the board member status of the individual, i.e. whether the board member is a staff 
representative or not. From Table 7 it is seen that the proportion of females among staff 
board members is substantially higher than among other board members, and furthermore it 
appears that, contrary to the general negative trend of women in the Danish boards, the 
female share among the staff members has increased slightly over the observation period.  
 
Table 7. Proportion of women among members of boards of directors including and 
excluding staff members. 1996 and 2001 
  1996 2001 
Board of directors, all 
  0.117 0.099 
Board of directors, excl. staff  
  0.101 0.080 
Board of directors, staff only 
  0.194 0.207 
 
 
If we assume that women who are selected into the board of directors are as qualified 
as their male colleagues who are staff representatives on the board of directors, and if a 
proportion of female non-staff board members have family ties to the owners, we will expect 
that a potential positive effect of females on boards is larger for female staff members than 
for female non-staff members.
11   
In Table 8, this hypothesis is tested. The first row of estimates corresponds to the 
estimates for the female board member effects presented in Table 3 where only one small 
                                                 
11 We do not have direct information on family ties in our sample. But for the 100 largest Danish firms more 
than two thirds of all female supervisory board members (excl. staff representatives) have family ties to the 
owners. 
  26positive significant effect was found. When we split the female board member effects, i.e. 
estimates two separate performance effects for the female proportion on the board, an 
interesting picture emerges: 7 out of 8 estimates are now significant and for the staff 
members of the board the four coefficients are positive and very significant. On the other 
hand, for female non-staff members of the board the effects are significantly negative and 
rather large in two out of four cases. 
 
Table 8. Estimated coefficients of effects of proportion of women among members of boards 
of directors  (β3). Pooled OLS, 1996-2001
1).  
  











Net result after 
tax/net assets 

























































No. of obs.  12,085  12,085  12,080  12,085 
* denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 1% level of significance.  
1) Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj R
2  is reported in row 3, and row 4 






  27Thus, female non-staff members of boards of directors seem to have a less positive or 
even negative effect on firm performance compared to staff members. This finding may 
indicate that firms who employ family members on their board of directors seem to be less 




The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the influence of the proportion of women in 
management on firm performance. There is a theoretical as well as an empirical motivation 
for dealing with this issue of corporate governance. In the theoretical section of the paper, we 
argue that board diversity affects the performance of the firm. However, according to the 
existing theory the influence can be positive as well as negative. The empirical motivation 
comes from the increasing focus on the gender composition of top executives and boards of 
directors of firms. The proportion of women who reach top positions in the business sector is 
still very low in most countries, though it has been increasing in some countries. In some 
countries, like Sweden and Norway, it is even considered to regulate the gender composition 
of the boards of directors of private firms in order to improve equal opportunities. If it can be 
shown statistically that more female top executives (or other minority groups) or women on 
boards of directors have positive effects on firm performance, this may be a strong argument 
for having more women on boards.  
Using a sample of the 2500 largest Danish firms over the period 1993-2001, we 
analyse empirically whether the proportion of female top CEOs or members of boards of 
directors really affects firm performance. The conclusion is ambiguous and depends both on 
                                                 
12 This corresponds to the results of Bennedsen et al. (2005) who find for a sample of Danish firms that family 
successions in CEO positions have a negative impact on performance compared to non-family successions. 
  28the measure of performance and the measure of the proportion of women in management. 
The effect on firm performance of a higher fraction of female top CEOs varies from none to 
positive. Performance measures which approximate the mark-up, e.g. gross value added, are 
affected more positively and more significantly than the other performance measures, e.g. net 
result/assets. Furthermore, the results show that the positive performance effects are mainly 
related to female managers with a university degree while female CEOs who do not hold a 
university degree have a much smaller or insignificant effect on firm performance.  
Next, female members of boards of directors elected by the staff seem to have 
positive effects on firm performance. However, this positive effect does not carry over to 
other female board members, where the effect is negative - a result, which may be explained 
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  31Appendix 
 
Table A1. Estimated coefficients of alternative variables reflecting proportion of women in 
management (β2 and β3). Fixed- and random effect estimations, 1993-2001
1). 
  









Net result after 
tax/net assets 
 

























































































































































* denotes that the estimated parameter is statistically different from 0 at the 1% level of significance.  
1) Values in brackets are standard errors of the estimated parameters, Adj. R
2  is reported in row 3, and row 4 
includes the number of observations in each regression analysis. The values reported in row 5 are Hausman Chi-
square test for systematic differences in estimated coefficients.  
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